But even in its limited role, the approval has provoked sharp criticism. (For a good overview, see Simmons 1979, 57-100; for a qualified defense, see Beran 1987.) These focus on the questions of whether it actually exists and, if given, whether it would bind. Consent is not mere consensus or consent; It is a performative commitment that assumes a commitment through the act of consent itself. However, as with other promises and oaths, there are limits to its validity. We must ensure that consent is not revoked by mistake, coercion or coercion. It must also respect the limits of its validity in terms of content. Locke argues that one cannot accept being killed, and therefore not slavery, and therefore nothing that amounts to slavery, including absolute government. One can think of an argument similar to the conclusion that political consent must be revocable. But as we build under all these conditions of validity, the commitment itself seems to do less and less work. Pitkin thinks he becomes “essentially irrelevant” in Locke`s version (Pitkin 1965, 57).
Approval is saved from irrelevance only if we can explain why we value the power of committing to obedience. David Hume could not think of any reason: keeping one`s promises is an “artificial virtue” that serves the common good, just like obedience to the law. As long as the law is reasonably legitimate – and Hume is prepared to give it a very large place – a promise to keep is superfluous, because any plausible answer to the question of why we are bound by the promise would have “immediately, without any cycle, taken into account our obligation of fidelity”; “Since we are of equal power and authority, we gain nothing by dissolving one into the other” (Hume 1985, 481). However, a theory of consent does not have to “dissolve” fidelity into a promise – there may also be non-culpable conditions for obedience – but it must explain why it should depend on it. Three types of arguments were popular. First, there are good reasons for wanting a conscious control of responsibility for legal obligations. In political authority, where the stakes are as high as they come, the power to give and refuse consent fulfills a function of ultimate protection beyond what we might expect from the fallible institutions of limited government. Second, consent allows people to build political loyalties by creating new political societies or joining existing ones, without waiting for the gradual emergence of community ties and reciprocity; Consent is an immediate passport to “perfect membership” in a Commonwealth. (Locke: § 119). Third, although consent is defined by its performative character, it is naturally accompanied by complementary non-performative characteristics: consent also expresses acceptance, or at least approval, of the government. This may mark approval leaders as important among a number of potential competitors, and it may indicate that they have a good chance of being effective, which in itself is a necessary condition for justifying any political authority.
One of the earliest known classifications was made by Gaius in his institutions, which divided obligations into ex contracted obligations (obligations arising from legal action) and ex delicto obligations (obligations arising from illegal and unlawful acts). However, since this classification is clearly too vague, Gaius, in his book Res cottidinanae, classified all the obligations as ex contractu obligations and ex delicto obligations mentioned above, as well as obligations ex variis causarum figuris, a heterogeneous category intended to include all cases of obligations not arising from torts or contracts. An explicit commitment means that the duties, tasks or promises are expressly stated in the agreement or conditions. For example, Jacob`s new employment contract provides that he will stay with the company for two years and close at least 100 files per year. The basis of Rawls` theory necessarily becomes evident when we examine what it might be for a just institution to “apply to us.” A.J. Simmons argues convincingly that an Institute for the Advancement of Philosophers cannot benefit us, even rightly, and then demands that we pay its dues (Simmons 1979, 148). He therefore suggests that a normatively relevant sense of application requires accepting benefits – but that means transforming a natural mandatory account into a weakly voluntarist account like equity. (See below, § 5.3.) Jeremy Waldron diagnoses the power of such counter-examples as a consequence of the fact that the Institute, although functioning, is not something whose activities are required by the judiciary: they are optional, not necessary (Waldron 1993).
