The most influential critics of Austin`s version of the genealogical thesis, however, owe to H. L. A. Hart`s seminal work The Concept of Law. Hart points out that Austin`s theory provides, at best, a partial representation of legal validity because it focuses on one type of rule, namely that which requires citizens to “do or refrain from certain actions, whether they like it or not” (Hart, 1994, 81). While any legal system must contain so-called primary rules governing the behavior of citizens, Hart believes that a system consisting entirely of the kind of restrictions on liberty found in criminal law is at best a rudimentary or primitive legal system. Although Mill`s view—or something similar—is topical in public, it has caused considerable controversy among legal philosophers and political philosophers. Many philosophers believe that Mill underestimates the limits of the state`s legitimate authority over the individual, arguing that the law can be used to uphold morality, protect the individual from himself, and in some cases, protect individuals from offensive behavior. Accordingly, according to Dworkin, theoretical disagreement on key cases such as Riggs is incompatible with semantic legal theories because it shows that common criteria do not exhaust the appropriate conditions for the application of the legal concept. Indeed, the majority and the dissenting judges in Riggs had reasonable disagreement on the law, even though it was a crucial case involving validity criteria. Therefore, Dworkin concludes, the concept of law cannot be explained by what is called the semantics of criteria.

The positivist representation of legal validity is difficult to reconcile with [the assertion] that the applicable law as such, whatever its content, deserves our general respect and loyalty. Even if a valid law is a bad law, we have a certain obligation to obey it simply because it is the law. But how is this possible if the validity of a law has nothing to do with its content? According to positivism, the source of a law is the establishment of that law by a socially recognized legal authority. The merits of a law are another matter: it may be a “bad law” by a certain standard, but if it has been added to the system by a legitimate authority, it is still a law. Every human society has some form of social order, a way to mark and promote approved behavior, to deter disapproved behavior, and to resolve disputes about that behavior. So what distinguishes companies with legal systems and within these companies by their law? Before examining some positivist answers, it should be emphasized that these are not the only questions worth asking about the law. While understanding the nature of law requires a representation of what makes law distinctive, it is also necessary to understand what it has in common with other forms of social control. Some Marxists are positivist about the nature of law, but insist that its distinguishing features are less important than its role in reproducing and facilitating other forms of government. (Although other Marxists disagree: see Pashukanis 1924).

They believe that the specificity of the law does little to shed light on their main concerns. But you can hardly know in advance; It depends on the nature of the law. More importantly, Hart argues that Austin overlooks the existence of secondary meta-rules that deal with primary rules themselves and distinguish full-fledged legal systems from primitive legal systems: Justifications for punishment generally take five forms: (1) retaliation; (2) deterrence; (3) preventive; (4) rehabilitation; and (5) restitution. According to the justification for retaliation, the punishment of a person justifies that he or she committed a crime that deserves punishment. From this perspective, it is morally appropriate for a person who has committed an unlawful act to suffer in proportion to the extent of his or her wrongdoing. The problem, however, is that the mere fact that someone deserves punishment does not mean that it is morally permissible for the state to impose punishments; For example, it would be wrong for me to punish someone else`s child even though their behavior might deserve it. The justification for restitution focuses on the effect of the offender`s unlawful act on the victim. Other theories of punishment conceptualize the illegal act as an insult to society; The theory of restitution considers misconduct to be a crime against the victim. From this point of view, the main purpose of punishment must therefore be to heal the victim as much as possible: “It is not a question that the perpetrator deserves to suffer; rather, it is the aggrieved party who seeks compensation” (Barnett, 1977, p. 289). Accordingly, an offence found guilty of misconduct should be convicted in order to compensate its victim in proportion to the loss of the victim. The problem with restitution theory is that it does not distinguish between compensation and punishment.

Compensatory objectives focus on the victim, while punitive objectives focus on the offender. Jules Coleman replies that if the rule of recognition is a social rule, Hart`s view implies that there must be general agreement among the officials of a legal system on the norms that constitute the rule of recognition, but this does not mean that there cannot be disagreement on what these norms require in a particular case: According to this view, legal principles are similar to legislation in this respect: both derive their power of recognition from official acts of courts and legislatures. The Riggs principle that no one should profit from his or her own wrongs is legally valid because it has been declared by a court to decide a dispute or has been formally promulgated by the competent legislative body.