The first principle that intervention does not respect is the ius ad bellum principle of just intention. This is a highly controversial principle with regard to humanitarian militarism, as some theorists argue that although the intention to reduce human suffering should be a primary motive for intervention, it is unrealistic to expect morally pure motives (Weiss, 2007: 7), and that “motives are not discredited simply because they turn out to be mixed” (Ignatieff, 2003: 23). Therefore, it is not necessary for the principle of just intent to be respected, as it does not matter whether other motives have a positive consequence when humanitarian objectives are achieved. 109 However, this does not prejudge the merits of arguments that the possibility of abuse of a right of humanitarian intervention can be more easily avoided or reduced by concerted action rather than genuinely unilateral, see, for example: Burmester, op. cit. Cit. note 20, pp. 282-83. The only point raised here is that, in assessing the generality of State practice, the mere fact of concerted action among 19 States does not alter the fact that there are still 19 cases of State practice.

The tradition of just war was originally developed to limit the devastation of conflict between two opposing forces by “allowing moral judgments in wartime” (Orend, 2006:10), and has rarely been applied to interventions on “humanitarian” grounds. However, since John Stuart Mill and Hugo Grotius challenged the undisputed norm of non-interference between post-Westphalian states (Mill, 1859; Wheeler, 2000:45), interventions, ostensibly in response to massive or serious human rights violations committed by sovereign states against their own citizens, have become commonplace, especially since the end of the cold war. Modern just war theorists are confronted with the “creation of a human rights norm as an imperative for action” (Chatterjee and Schied, 2003; 5), which calls into question the sanctity of state sovereignty when it is assumed that a state has abandoned its responsibility to protect its citizens by actively violating their individual and collective rights. In short, NATO`s war was neither a success nor a failure; In fact, it was both. He forced the Serbian government to withdraw its army and police from Kosovo and sign an agreement closely aligned with the failed Rambouillet agreement. It put an end to the systematic oppression of Kosovo Albanians. However, the intervention did not achieve its stated goal of preventing mass ethnic cleansing. Milosevic remained in power.

The Serbian people were the main losers. Kosovo has been lost. Many Serbs fled or were expelled from the province. Serbia has suffered significant economic losses and the destruction of civilian infrastructure. Independent media and NGOs have been repressed and the general level of repression in Serbia has increased. Just as the Commission has concluded that the conduct of military operations in humanitarian interventions should be conducted under particularly strict rules of engagement, it also concludes that media operations should be conducted under particularly strict disclosure rules. The Commission strongly believes that unhindered access by both sides to any humanitarian intervention is crucial if military operations by both sides are to be subject to effective public scrutiny. The Commission considers that there is no reason to restrict the ability of journalists to work in conflict zones where humanitarian intervention takes place.

The Commission strongly condemns attempts by the Serbian Government to restrict its own media coverage of the war and its consequences, in particular the detention of Miroslav Filipovic for his interviews with Federal Republic of Yugoslavia soldiers who took part in operations in Kosovo and for publishing his admission of atrocities and war crimes. On 23 March 1999, NATO launched a three-month bombing campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, ostensibly to prevent the ethnic cleansing of Kosovo Albanians in the semi-autonomous region of Serbia by the authoritarian regime of Slobodan Milosevic. The decision to launch a “humanitarian intervention” and the manner in which the campaign was conducted are highly controversial issues, as one would expect with such a “diffuse concept” that violates the international norm of non-interference (Holst, 1994:138). While NATO offers self-justifications that sympathetic and liberal experts on just war use to argue that intervention had some degree of moral legitimacy, opponents of various theoretical schools reject NATO`s moral right to launch a “humanitarian war” (Roberts, 1999: 102). 22 See, for example, Franck and Rodley, op. cit. cit., note 3, pp. 285-89. On the view that the French intervention in the Central African Republic in 1979 constituted a unilateral humanitarian intervention, see Simon, op.

cit. cit., note 2, pp. 147-48. Walzer attempts to do this by revising certain aspects of the legalistic paradigm and creating the conditions under which intervention based on the principles of ius ad bellum (war justice) and ius in bello (war justice) could be permitted. He believes that state sovereignty can be violated to: support secessionist movements that truly represent the political community; Compensate for previous interventions during civil wars and (as most often cited to justify NATO intervention in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) save innocent civilians from the threat of “slavery or state slaughter” (Walzer, 2006:90). This applies to actions against civilians that are so horrific that they “shock the moral conscience of humanity” as long as there is a reasonable expectation of successful interventions (2006:107). Acts that compel communitarians to intervene include genocide, ethnic cleansing, and serious human rights violations against which the population cannot defend itself (Chatterjee and Schied, 2003:3). Pro- and anti-interventionists agree that NATO bombing was intended to avoid Allied casualties and that such bombing posed a greater risk to civilians. Where pro- and anti-interventionists differ is whether “flying high” is compatible with the norms of international humanitarian law.

Conventions IV and Geneva Protocol I provide that civilians must be protected against “indiscriminate attacks”, i.e. attacks that “use a method or weapon that cannot be directed against a specific military objective” or “use a method or means of combat the effects of which cannot be adequately limited”. In addition, Protocol I requires military planners “to take all feasible precautions in the selection of means and methods of attack to avoid and in any event minimize accidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects”. It is not in the spirit of these provisions to increase the risk to civilians in order to avoid military casualties. 126 See, for example, summary of the President`s deliberations on Kosovo at the informal meeting of EU Heads of State or Government of 14 April 1999, Doc. S/199/429, in particular paragraph 2 (unanimous support for NATO`s intervention in Kosovo); Declaration of the Organization of the Islamic Conference Ministerial Meeting on Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, 7 April 1999, U.N. Doc. S/1999/394, 7.

April 1994 (condemning the human rights violations committed by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in Kosovo and regretting that the Security Council has not been able to fulfil its responsibilities in this regard). On the importance of tolerance in the formation of new customary norms, see, for example, MacGibbon, I. C., “Customary International Law and Acquiescence” (1957) 33 Brit. Y.B.I.L. 115–118–19.Google Scholar NATO`s intervention in Kosovo has shown domestic political problems as well as shortcomings in the use of military force as a humanitarian instrument. It has shown the limits of current international law in terms of the balance between the rights of citizens and the rights of States, and what happened after the war shows the immense obstacles to the creation of multi-ethnic cooperation in societies torn apart by ethnic wars. When assessing the legitimacy of humanitarian interventions, four main factors must be taken into account: (i) the existence of humanitarian grounds; (ii) the humanitarian reasons justifying the intervention; (iii) humanitarian assets; and (iv) humanitarian results.