1. Warren, MA. On the moral and legal status of abortion. The Monist 1973;57:43–61 CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed. Cited below as MLSA. Warren`s article has since been anthologized hundreds of times and is frequently used in courses in ethical theory, bioethics, and applied ethics. Notably, it has been cited at least 627 times by 2021. See, for example, Warren MA. On the moral and legal status of abortion. In: Cahn, S, ed.

Exploring Ethics. New York: Oxford University Press; 2009 Google Scholar. After a brief introduction, Warren answers Noonan`s question about the definition of a human being. He gives an example of a deductive argument that (1) it is wrong to kill innocent people, (2) fetuses are innocent people, and (3) it is wrong to kill fetuses. While I think this is a very reasonable argument with the basic definition of human, Warren goes further by discrediting his premise and turning it into a fallacy. (continue here) Warren suggests that the word “human” has two independent definitions, the moral sense and the genetic sense. The moral sense, also known as Homo sapiens, are the full members of the moral community, while the genetic sense of each member of the species is a human being. (argue here) Warren concludes his first section by delving deeper into Noonan`s arguments in “Deciding Who Is Human,” noting that fetuses have a complete genetic code and have the potential for rational thinking.

For this to be true, a fetus would have to be human in a moral sense, and while Noonan gives no evidence to support his statement, it shows the potential that a human can become a human in a moral sense. (argue) One could argue that the relationship between law and moral values is a highly controversial and hot topic. This is because moral rules and legal rights have many similarities, but they are certainly not the same thing. First of all, I can tell you that the difference between. 55. In his 1982 postscript to MLSA, Warren reluctantly acknowledged this concern, but continued to insist that infants resemble fetuses rather than “full-fledged” persons in several crucial ways. Sometimes the tension is palpable in the epilogue and in her later work Moral Status, as it seems that she wants to grant them some sort of average moral status, but she realizes that this would undermine her argument for all members of the moral community who have equal rights. A society must be in harmony.

Individuals within a community are expected to behave in accordance with what would benefit the majority of the population. To achieve such harmony, individuals must have a sense of morality. As described by. 2. Unlike Judith Jarvis Thomson, Warren argues that if full personality of the fetus is granted, it is not possible to conclusively assert that abortion is morally permissible. See Thomson, JJ. A defense of abortion. Philosophy and Public Affairs 1971;1:48 Google Scholar. 11. See Lee, p.

11. Das Pro-Life-Argument aus substanzieller Identität. Bioethics 2004;18:249–63CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed; George, RP, Gomez-Lobo, A. Der moralische Status des menschlichen Embryos. Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 2005;48:201–10CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed; Beckwith, F. Defending Life: A Moral and Legal Case Against Abortion Choice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 2007: 130–72CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Lee, P. Abortion and unborn human life. 2nd edition. Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press; 2010:8–108 Google Scholar; Kaczor, C. The ethics of abortion: women`s rights, human life and the question of justice. Londres: Routledge; 2014:41–152 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Lee, P, Tollefsen, C, George, RP.

The ontological status of embryos. The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 2014;39:483–504 CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed. Section 2 – The question is: “How should we define the moral community, the set of beings with full and equal moral rights, so that we can decide whether a human fetus is a member of that community or not?” Two questions arise: 1) What is a human being (genetic sense of man) and 2) What is a human being (moral sense of man)? Section 1 – She argues that we cannot conclusively prove that abortion is permitted if the fetus has a right to life. Thomson`s argument fails to the extent that the opponent of abortion can argue that one is responsible for the child, except in cases of rape. If we change the story of the violinist – who, in Thomson`s story, binds himself to a woman`s body to save her life – it seems that we are still obliged to save the violinist. Therefore, we must deal with the ontological status of the fetus. At the end of his section on moral community, Warren changes slightly to explain that genetic humanity really doesn`t matter in establishing a title like personality. People can`t always be people, and people aren`t always human. He gives the example of a person who suddenly loses consciousness forever, but remains alive; She sees them as human beings, but no longer as people.

It also evokes defective humans, fetuses, confident robots and supercomputers and other intelligent beings from different planets. Warren has already laid out his position on fetuses, a human, but not yet a person with full rights. However, I believe that the other examples are at the heart of this situation, starting with the person in a coma. I don`t think someone can simply lose their personal status because of a traumatic event, of course, that person is still the same and still alive, only they will never really wake up. Moving on to broken or disabled people, as I prefer to call them, what I think Warren means is someone who is unable to take care of herself and needs extra attention, rather than someone who is perfectly healthy. Leukodystrophies may be an example of what Warren is referring to, such as Alexander`s disease, which is a genetic disorder of the brain that affects every aspect of a person`s daily activities, such as walking, speaking, behavior, and even a person`s senses. Although the unhappy soul will eventually end sooner than most, it still tends to live into middle age. With all of this, you can`t disqualify someone from all their rights just because they don`t meet the definition of normality. To me, it really seems to have become such, an elite club where only the biggest, the best and the healthiest enter, while everyone else is left to fend for themselves.

40. Although this gap is acknowledged in their reasoning on moral status, their revised conception of moral community remains problematic. In particular, Warren now includes infants, PHA patients, and people with severe cognitive impairments. As Warren notes, because these individuals are “objects of empathy” or cross the “lowest threshold of sensitivity,” they can be recognized as members of the moral community. The difficulty for Warren, however, is that this recognition undermines his exclusion of fetuses from the moral community, as well as his specific argument in defense of abortion. Warren`s constant challenge is to find a way to incorporate these “marginal cases” without also including fetuses that meet the same moral status criteria. As Warren notes, “It is both impractical and emotionally abhorrent to deny full moral status to sentient people who have not yet attained (or irretrievably lost) the capacity for moral free will.